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Abstract 
The current international economic and political climate is governed by the attendance of emerging geopolitical tensions that 
started to the onset of the Ukrainian crisis that culminated to Crimean annexation to Russia and the imposition of mutual 
economic sanctions between the EU and Russia. Authors' analysis has been centered on the economic links between the Ukraine, 
Russia and EU, highlighting the evolution of relevant macro indicators such as foreign direct investment and trade.  
The paper proposes a foresight analysis in order to underline the risks and threats induced by the Crimean crisis in the field of 
international economic relations. 
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1. Introduction 
Currently, the balance of EU, Russia and Ukraine’ economic and political relations has been reconsidered due to 
implications of the Crimean crisis that have induced essential consequences on the regional level. 
The paper consists of an analysis of possible scenarios for the reopening cooperation within the triad EU - Russia 
- Ukraine in a stability and sustainable growth climate. The Crimean crisis wouldn’t be analysed solely by 
highlighting the economic and political losses of the Ukrainian state, but taking into account the implications of the 
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global economic crisis on regional geopolitics of Europe. The international financial and economic crisis 
considerably prejudiced Ukrainian economy. According to official national statistics (UKRSTAT) Ukraine 
experienced a severe recession that recorded to a deep fall of 14.8% in terms of GDP growth in 2009.Since then the 
economic growth have been fragile and estimations for the 2014 shows the possibility ofa second recession after a 
single year of economic stagnation in 2013 (see Figure 1). The Ukraine’s desire to become more closely to the EU 
has been increased gradually being heightened more since the admission of the 10 new EU Member States in 2004, 
including Poland the west neighbor of Ukraine and the signing of the Eastern Partnership. Being affected by a deep 
crisis, Ukraine has considered increased trade cooperation to EU would boost its economic recovery. History of 
Ukraine’s agreements and partnerships (since 1997) illustrates this strategic approach to create a lasting economic 
basis with the EU (see the Explanatory notes on the history of Ukraine - EUrelations at the end of the paper).On the 
other hand, after the rise to power of Vladimir Putin, Russia has begun to restore its economic and geopolitical links 
in the former USSR region. The central project of Russia’s strategic approach is the establishment of Eurasian 
Union, a free trade area of all trade partners. Ukraine, as the traditional economic and political partner, was invited 
to join on it. 
In the last couple of years, Ukraine has hesitated between the EU and Russia, and some analyses (Miller, 2013) 
emphases this "yo-yo game" that apparently worked in its advantage. 
The worsening economic condition of Ukraine due to the profound effects induced by the international economic 
crisis was a decisive factor in its strengthening linksto EU, and some analysts (Secrieru, 2013) perceive the 
relationship to Russia has been slowly worsened. 
Taking into consideration the increasing of oil companies interests in the European market, as well as Russian 
solutions to the crisis produced by the EU and USA economic sanctions (China-Russia deal for the supply of gas 
and food import ban from the EU and USA) it’s noticeably that Ukraine is just a "small piece" in a complex network 
of economic, political and military interests developed in the context of the Crimean crisis. This paper highlights 
possible scenarios for solving the Crimean crisis, on the basis of durable economic interdependence between EU, 
Russia and Ukraine. 
2. The effects of the international economic crisis on European geopolitics  
Triggered as a result of new geopolitical strategy of both Ukraine and Russia, the Crimean crisis showed, 
according to the literature review (Restuccia, 2014) how political decisions would quickly lead to negative economic 
effects on regional and international level between all power poles involved. One of the factors† that triggered the 
current crisis in Crimea, which might be able to redraw the map of international economic relations, is linked, as it is 
considered in the literature in the field (Baranovsky, 2000), of the Russian Federation’s regaining status of regional 
power through the Eurasian Union. This project aims to bring closer former Soviet states over a closer economic 
integration. While Russian Federation campaigned to integrate Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and Kazakhstan in the 
Eurasian Union, the Eastern Partnership Summit held in November 2013 in Vilnius represented the European 
Union's attempt to enlarge further to the East. Vilnius summit brought together heads of state and government 
fromall the 28 EU member states and Eastern Partnership countries.  The Ukraine’s decision to suspend all 
negotiations that could lead to Association Agreement to EU was totally surprizing. This political decision was 
followed by pro-European riots‡that supported closer cooperation to EU and even a possible integration into the EU. 
The authors consider that main motivation for this choice was an economic one, since Russia endangered to increase 
duties on imports from Ukraine(See Figure 1). 
 
 
 
† But not the only one, because the sudden change of strategy of Ukraine to start negotiations for the Association Agreement with the EU is 
also a cause of accelerating crisis in Crimea. 
‡ "Pro-European" demonstrations occurred as a result of former President Viktor Yanukovich's and the parliamentary majority decision, 
before the Vilnius Summit, which consisted from a "pause" in negotiations with the EU. 
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Fig. 1: Evolution of Ukraine GDP between 2009 -2014 (%) 
Source: UKRSTAT, 2014. 
 
Russia’s reaction on a possible Ukraine closeness to EU could be explained by having in mind the close and 
durable economic and political relations between the two neighbouring countries. Ukraine has been considered as 
part of Russian influence but its support ended to the annexation of Crimea from June 2014. Some international 
analysts appreciated that the successive enlargements of the EU and NATO in Central and Eastern Europe are still 
interpreted by the Kremlin through the zero-sum game (Secrieru, 2013). 
Following the crisis in Crimea, Ukraine currently faces two fundamental problems: the difficult economic 
situation and the division of the population into pro-European, anti-Russian nationalists (the first two now allies) 
and pro-Russian. But in the context of Crimea annexation and Russian forces attempting to destabilize eastern 
Ukraine, the country’ cohesion has become more considerable manifesting the reoccurrence of Ukraine on the way 
to the Eurasian Union. 
2.1. EU-Russia economic relationships: which one of the two countries is more affected by the conflict in Ukraine 
Russian annexation of Crimea led to a "cooling effect" in the political relations to European partners and the 
adoption of sequences of mutual economic sanctions. Ukrainian crisis led firstly to a series of economic sanctions 
imposed by the EU and the USA against Russian economy, followed by a series of sanctions from the Kremlin 
targeted mainly against EU. After the annexation of Crimea it became obvious the Western democratic community 
requirements to impose economic sanctions, which, although expensive, especially for the EU, represented a clear 
dissatisfaction to the Russian expansionary policy. Some analyses (The Economist, 2014) shows the economic 
sanctions give a clear message that further expansionary policy associated to consequences for neighbouring 
countries would lead to political and economic separation of Russia, with significant penalties for its economic 
development. Firstly the EU has imposed economic sanctions for blocking the accounts and shares of many 
important people from the Russian Federation as well as the rejection of travel visas. Also since March 2014 the 
United States has established economic sanctions against 20 members of the inner circle of Vladimir Putin regime 
and against Russian credit institutions. USA sanctions stipulate freezing assets of those people who will not be able 
to conclude any business partnerships with citizens and American companies. Economic sanctions imposed by the 
United States prompted the withdrawal of major North American companies from the Russian market, among them 
payment card operators Visa and MasterCard, which stopped providing payment services to customers in Russia for 
several banks, including "Rossiya Bank", which has some of the most valuable state assets. As a result, a recently 
published analysis of the IMF (IMF, 2014), shows that the decline in GDP growth rate is imminent for 2014, 
indicating the probability of a recession in Russia as a consequence of economic and political tensions toE U and the 
United States (Figure 2). 
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Fig. 2: Evolution of the Russian GDP growth in the 2010 -2015 period (%) 
 Sources: International Monetary Fund - Russian Federation: Concluding Statement for the 2014 Consultation Mission, April 30, 2014, the 
European Commission - Economic Forecast, spring, 2014, OECD - Russian Federation - Country Survey 2014, May 2014  
Note 1: Data for 2014 are estimates and those for 2015 predictions. 
 
Another sanctions’ effect against Russia is the depreciation of the rouble against the major international 
currencies. Ukraine crisis precipitated drastically this consequence. Amid international banks reluctance to lend 
Russian business customers, some Japanese banks also withdrew from the Russian market, by eliminating 
transactions and suspension of credit lines. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (SMBC) and Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UFJ (BTMU) are two of the largest Japanese banks that have adopted such procedures. SMBC pulled out 
from an export financing agreement to Metalloinvest, a Russian company operating in metallurgy and mining owned 
by the oligarch Alisher Usmanov.The bank also suspended credit lines opened for oil trader Gunvor after the United 
States imposed sanctions on the co-founder Gennady Timchenko. BTMU has decided not to take part in a financing 
agreement with Tenex, an important uranium export company of Russia. Moreover, IMF analysts expected that the 
domestic banking sector would be affected by the Russian crisis in Ukraine, since many Russian banks have 
significant exposure to the markets of Ukraine, having negative consequences on the economic growth (Figure 3). 
 
Fig. 3: The main Russian banks affected by the economic crisis in Ukraine (as% of total assets of each bank affected in 2012)Source: Raiffeisen 
Bank, 2013 
In May 2014, the French car manufacturer Renault has announced that it has frozen plans for commercial 
production in partnership to Russian ZIL in Moscow because of the recently sharp rouble depreciation.  
In the most recent projections, Rating Agency Standard & Poor’s downgraded the sovereign rating of Russia 
from “stable” to “negative” because the negative impact of sanctions imposed. A recent evaluation of Fitch Rating 
Agency also shows that the development prospects of the Russian economy are affected by the fact that USA and 
EU banks might be reluctant to lend Russian customers under the current unsecured environment. As a consequence, 
GDP rate would depreciate further and the private sector need a considerable state care within the FDI weakening 
and the massive withdrawals of foreign capital. As a result of the rouble depreciation, Russia’s Central Bank 
increased the key interest rate to 7.5% (50 basis points)in May 2014. Some analysts (OECD, 2014) considers that 
Central Bank of Russia decision was based on inflationary pressures that would add stress due to Western economic 
sanctions, and for diminishing the foreign capital withdrawal from the Russian market. The latest analysis of the 
Central Bank of Russia (CBR, 2014) shows the international pressures caused by Crimean crisis directly affect 
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production and investment in Russia: “Labour productivity growth is slow, while investment in fixed capital 
decreases because of declining profits and limited access to long-term financing on international markets, but also 
because of the low consumer and producers confidence”. According to the authors, the Russian economy and also 
the EU economies are affected by current crisis. Currently, according to Eurostat, EU and Russia are highly 
dependent in terms of trade. Eurostat data shows that Russia was the EU’s third largest trading partnering 2013. The 
EU also ranks first among FDI providers for Russia. Therefore, economic sanctions imposed to Russia for its actions 
in Ukraine and the Russian reaction by prohibiting imports from the EU, mainly agricultural products and food, 
heavily affect manufacturers and companies in the EU. Russia decided to fight back with a complete ban on food 
imports from the EU and USA as a response of economic sanctions. The prohibition is applied for beef, pork, 
poultry and fish the imports, as well as for cheese, milk, vegetables and fruits imports from the United States, 
European Union, Australia, Canada and Norway. We previously showed that Western economic sanctions could 
lead to recession in the Russian Federation, but it must be noted that EU economies would also be affected by the 
Russian economic sanctions. According to Eurostat, it is estimated that European farmers would suffer losses of 
over 2 billion euros, due to the fact that they would be deprived of one of the main export markets. In response to 
this crisis, the European Commission has already allocated aid amounting 125 million euros. The Russian 
Federation is the largest export market for fruit and vegetables, being the third largest trading partner for the EU (see 
Figure 4). 
Fig. 4: European Union’s major trading partners (billions of dollars) 
Source: DG Trade, data available for 2011, the most recent available. 
 
On the other hand, the EU depends on the gas imports from the Russian Federation, and the latter recorded a 
significant trade surplus (see Figure 5) during 2002 -2013, although the Russian imports from the EU grew faster 
than exports. Eurostat data also shows that the EU and Russia have gradually developed a close trade and 
investment cooperation, making them dependent on each other. During 2002-2013 period, trade between the two 
sides gradually increased: both imports (exports of EU firms to Russia increased by 3.5 times) and exports (EU 
imports from Russia have seen an increase by 3.3 times). Between 2002-2013, Eurostat data show a gradual increase 
of the EU's trade deficit to Russia over almost 3 times (see Figure 5). In 2008, the EU and Russia have begun 
negotiations for a new trade agreement that would involve requirements and incentives for both sides in order to 
increase bilateral trade. In 2010, however, negotiations have been frozen, and Russia moved towards the creation of 
a Customs Union together with Kazakhstan and Belarus. In this context it should be noted that the EU was the main 
ally of Russia in negotiations for its inclusion in the WTO in 2012. 
444.8
428.4
306.8
212.9
140
120.2
116.4
79.7
73.5
68.5
0 100 200 300 400 500
USA
China
Russia
Switzerland
Norway
Turkey
Japan
India
Brazil
South Korea
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Year
2002
Year
2003
Year
2004
Year
2005
Year
2006
Year
2007
Year
2008
Year
2009
Year
2010
Year
2011
Year
2012
Year
2013
457 Simona Moagăr-Poladian and Andreea Drăgoi /  Procedia Economics and Finance  22 ( 2015 )  452 – 462 
 
Fig. 5: Russia's trade surplus to the EU (billion euros) in the period 2002-2012 
Source: Eurostat, 2013 
However, the Russian trade surplus to EU hasn’t favourable for economic development of Russia. While Russia 
exports mainly raw materials (especially of oil and gas), the EU exports mostly high value-added goods, machinery 
and equipment, chemicals and food (see Figure 6). 
 
Fig. 6: Structure of Russian imports from the EU in 2013 (%) 
Source: UNCTAD, 2013 
According to the authors, the EU, Russia and Ukraine economic relations looks like a game of dominoes: the EU 
is the main trading partner for Russia, while Russia is the main trading partner of Ukraine. Russian exports to the 
EU and Ukraine consist mainly from natural gas and oil, while Ukraine and EU counterbalance to complementary 
products (especially agricultural products, machinery and military equipment § ), according to consumer 
requirements. Statistical data published by Eurostat show that, the EU as a whole was the second trade partner of 
Ukraine after Russia in 2013, both in terms of exports and imports. Currently, the energy supply of the EU depends 
on Russia, as we illustrated. According to Eurostat, from the total EU energetic imports, of 405.8 billion euros, 35% 
came from Russia. In respect of the categories of hydrocarbons imported, it can be noted that most of EU 
dependence on imports from Russia is recorded under natural gas in gaseous state (representing 49% of total EU 
imports in 2013). 
The EU energy dependence on Russia would continue in the future due to Russia's remarkable progress in terms 
of investing. In 2013 its advance from 9th to 3rd place worldwide in attracting FDI after the USA and China partly 
was determined by the acquisition of TNK-BP by Rosneft, the state owned Russian company (with 57 billion 
dollars), making Rosneft the largest oil company in the world. Moreover, in 2013, the Russia’s policy of attracting 
FDI captured the interest of several major companies. In 2013 Abu Dhabi's Mubadala signed a contract of 5 billion 
dollars with Russia for the development of major infrastructure projects. Additional contracts of 8 billion dollars 
were signed with Japan Bank for International Cooperation (in the banking sector) Caisse Des Depots International 
(financial services), Fondo Italiano Strategico (financial services) and Korea Investment Corporation (financial 
services). Due to its capacity on attracting FDI in 2012-2013, Russia received 20 additional points in the World 
Bank’s Ranking on business climate**, being considered the most dynamic country in BRICS. The rapid advance of 
Russian global investing attractiveness influenced the Russia inclusion among the top 50 business destinations in the 
world (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
§ Made in EU. 
* *  See World Bank’s Doing Business Rating, 2013. 
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Fig 7: Place of Russia in 2013 in the global hierarchy of attracting FDI 
Source: UNCTAD, 2013 
 
In this context it should be noted, however, that before the crisis in Crimea, Russia was a major recipient of FDI 
from the EU and a possible "freeze" of the FDI flow (of both type of FDI: outward and inward) involve the risk of 
great economic imbalances for both parties (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Fig. 8: Overview of FDI flows (inward and outward) of the EU to Russia during 2010-2013 (billion euros) 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2013 
2.2. Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU in the current geopolitical context  
Association Agreements between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, initiated after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the USSR, were the focus of EU representatives in the period 1991-2000. An 
analysis of the agreements concluded during this period indicates that they had a common denominator: they held 
little regard for national characteristics.  
Candidate countries have undergone a process of monitoring the achievement of clear indicators of convergence 
in the transition to free market economy, namely:  
i. Macroeconomic stability provided by monetary and fiscal policies that were aimed at reducing inflationary 
spiral triggered by price liberalization;  
ii. Independence of the National Central Bank, in order to develop monetary policies implemented through the 
national banking system;  
iii.Creating a national tax system adapted to economic realities. 
After the entry into force of the European Association Agreements, the EU has gradually become the main 
trading partner of every country from Eastern and Central Europe. EU-CEEC first summit was held in Brussels on 5 
February 1990, and the main topic of debate was the replacement of Trade and Cooperation Agreements signed 
before the 1990 to the Association Agreements. It must be noted that the official statement issued after the summit 
specified that the EU Association Agreements are addressed to all states of Central and Eastern Europe, excluding 
the former USSR states. Note that Association Agreements have characteristics of free trade agreements and are 
considered pre-accession instruments. Gradually, the EU became the main trading partner of every country in 
Central and Eastern Europe, with an average share of 65% in all trade, compared to an average of 25% before 1989.  
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Returning to Ukraine and EU partnerships, it is important to note that the Association Agreement between the 
two parties specifies only an increase of trade between the two sides, not the possibility of Ukraine accession. After 
1990, Russia has been reluctant to the possible EU expansion to Central and Eastern European countries, 
considering that could harm its economic interests in the region. The two neighbours, Russia and Ukraine are 
closely interlinked in terms of trade, investment and social ties. Of the total population, 17% is made of ethnic 
Russians, the largest proportion among all countries that signed Association Agreements to EU. From a commercial 
perspective, Russia is by far the main trading partner of Ukraine, to nearly 17.6 billion dollars exports and 27.5 
billion dollars imports (UKRSTAT, 2013).  Looking back at the historical setting of the EU - Russia relations, it is 
worthy to mention the meeting in Malta in 1989, that determined that Eastern European states will be supported in 
the economic reconstruction efforts subsequent to collapse of communist regimes and in the process of democratic 
transition to free market economy. Some analysis of the literature (Szporluk, 2000) points out that this agreement 
wasn’t appropriate in the case of Ukraine or any other former USSR member. However, as EU continued Eastern 
expansion, countries of the former Soviet Union began to be considered as potential future members because of the 
attractive potential markets for European companies (see the 2004 Enlargement when Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania 
became member states). 
Ukraine, a state with a population of about 45 million, is only on the 50th place among the world exporters, the 
share of Ukrainian exports in world total being very small of 0.37% (UKRSTAT, 2013). A country of this size and 
with such small share of total world exports reflects an economic underdevelopment. The economy of this country is 
dependent on its great power neighbour - Russia. The Ukrainian economy needs to import 75% of its oil, gas 
resources and raw materials required for the entire operation of nuclear reactors and its main trading partner, Russia, 
covers all these needs.  
Analysis of treaties between the EU and the Russian Federation in the early 90s, since Perestroika was initiated 
by the former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, shows that the EU has undertaken not to expand between the 
borders of the former USSR. But the entrance as a full member states of Poland and other countries near Ukraine 
during the EU’s greater enlargement in 2004, gave hope for all the former USSR, that were not included before in 
EU enlargement policy: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia. At the military level, Ukraine is one of the five states 
of the former USSR who have signed the NATO Partnership for Peace in 1994. The dialogue between the two sides 
intensified after 2005, but there is still no action plan as exist in the case of Georgia, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Unlike the other countries mentioned, Ukraine is facing strong opposition of Russia who 
believe that inclusion of Ukraine in NATO is "a direct threat to Russia“. 
2.3.  Interest of firms supplying gas outside the EU related to the European market  
Given the effect of uncertainty that the Ukrainian crisis produced in the EU – Russian trade relations and 
analysing the composition of the EU-Russian trade balance it can be observed, the substantial dependence of EU 
from Russia regarding the energy resources, as previously noted in the paper,.  
On the other hand, the non-EU companies, especially American ones, producing gasoline, see the European 
market as a source of income that can provide huge profits and sustainable growth in the future. After more than 
three decades of prohibition, the United States recently the export ban to low degree of processing petroleum 
products. If soon they will get the approval to export liquefied gas, then EU countries would reduce dependence on 
Russian gas and, on the other hand, American firms would have significant profits. According to a recent report by 
the Energy Information Administration for the USA (EIA), the EU, Turkey, Norway, Switzerland and the Balkan 
States consumed 660.4 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in 2013. Russia has covered 30% of this amount, the largest 
amount coming through pipelines from Ukraine. Note that in the years before the global financial crisis; more than 
80% of Russian gas was supplied through Ukrainian pipelines toward EU. This share gradually decreased to 60% 
after the construction of the North Stream (completed in 2011) which directly supply Germany via the Baltic Sea. 
Currently, gas consumption in Ukraine comes 60% from Gazprom. After the recent political events in Ukraine, the 
country's parliament has agreed to negotiate the price of gas passage through Ukrainian pipelines with companies 
from the USA and EU. If negotiations would indicate to an agreement, the foreign companies would hold up to 49% 
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shares, while Ukraine would retain control, having 51% of the total. Some analysts (Nafeez, 2014) consider that if 
such a business model is adopted, it would increase confidence in the Ukrainian economy, which would gradually 
decrease economic dependence on Russia. Such an agreement would help to decrease the importance of the South 
Stream project linking Russia to the South Eastern Europe countries under the Black Sea. However, the current 
existing military tensions in Ukraine would create uncertainty in that matter of gas supply for EU countries. Lifting 
the USA ban on exports of liquefied natural does not solve the problem on short term due to the lack of the 
necessary infrastructure. At least for the moment, the cost of shipping liquefied natural gas to Europe is much higher 
than the transportation cost of Russian gas. 
3. Ukrainian crisis resolving scenarios and a sustainable future 
From an economic perspective, the Ukrainian crisis solely would have only a little impact on world trade, if we 
consider its market position. Specifically, Ukraine accounts for about 0.35% of global imports and exports, ranking 
50 in the world. Even have been passing 22 years since Ukraine separated fromthe Soviet Union, Ukraine is among 
the countries with a low index of economic freedom, being ranked 155 in the world, having a score of 49.4. This 
score put Ukrainewell below the regional average index of 67.1 and below the world average of 60.3. Index of 
Economic Freedom has among its components the degree of corruption and property rights, where Ukraine has the 
lowest values in the region and some of the lowest in the world. Connections of influential businessmen and 
politicians ensure their privileges and their huge profits, while contracts are not always respected, because 
expropriation is always an option. 
EU’s external interest is now represented by its powerful and influential member states (Germany, France and 
UK). In terms of NATO’s pressure, Germany is the centerpiece in the EU. If we consider the announcement made 
by German Chancellor Angela Merkel on reducing military spending by cutting the defense budget for 2015 to 
almost one billion euros (from 33.3 to 32,4 billion euros) in a time when German economy is performing better than 
other EU countries, we would conclude a military conflict is not seriously considered by it. All the facts lead to the 
conclusion that, presently, Germany would like to solve the tensions between Russia and Ukraine in a pacifist 
manner, since its economic relations to Russia are very tight. Germany ranks first in terms of EU exports to Russia, 
with 30% of the total, while absorbing 20% of total EU imports from Russia. The following Russia's major trading 
partners in the EU are Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and France. In this respect, it should be noted that, in 2013, 
almost 85% of EU exports to Russia were represented by manufactured goods, while approx. 70% of its imports 
from Russia were hydrocarbons.  
Clearly, in Europe, the approach regarding Ukraine is pursued through the economic interests of its powerful 
states. Taking into account that under the European Security Strategy of 2003 the central objective was to build “a 
ring” of well governed countries around the EU, the Ukraine has an important role to play in this context, namely to 
become a democratic and  prosperous state on the EU border.  
What are the alternatives to stop the conflict in Ukraine?  
Is Russia interested to split Ukraine?  
According to the authors, Russia wouldn’t be in favour  of a divided Ukraine, since the regions of western 
Ukraine, closed to the EU can benefit from substantial investment funds, which might lead to a gradually increase of 
the standard of living in the area. Such a development would create a welfare gap between the citizens of the two 
Ukraine, which would again lead to tensions in the area.  
A perhaps less painful option would be the creation of a federation of regions within a single state, Ukraine. 
Russia would have no interest in splitting Ukraine, but certainly has interests in maintaining Crimea under its 
control, given its geostrategic location. The federalisation of Ukraine would be also in the interest of EU states, 
given the strong trade and foreign investment in the area.  
Such a scenario, of federalism would be also in the benefit of Ukraine. Taking into the consideration the potential 
gains and losses, it should be noted what Ukraine expects an increase of at least 0.5% of GDP. But these gains 
would be lost from the application of Russian extra customs duties. At the moment, the financial support from the 
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EU (through the Financial Aid Package adopted by the European Commission) seems to offset the losses incurred as 
a result of the conflict with Russia.  
The Ukraine exports to EU may not lead as soon as expected to economic growth and to improved living 
standards. Such expectations are almost impossible to achieve in the short and medium term in view of the 
arguments mentioned previously in our paper, namely:  
a. The Ukraine and EU dependence on Russia in terms of oil imports; viable solutions cannot be applied on the 
short term because other possible infrastructure routes cannot be built overnight;  
b. Highly interdependent relation in terms of foreign direct investment between EU and Russia, which would lead 
to a powerful lobby of corporations involved in finding a diplomatic solution to the crisis of Crimea;  
c. Though Ukraine is a country with a huge potential which makes it attractive for foreign investors, both in the 
EU and the USA, China and Japan, their economic interests related to Russia are more important, given its huge 
geostrategic and geo-economics potential.  
d. Western powers and also the USA do not want an economic collapse of Russia, which would incite to further 
expansion of political and economic tensions; furthermore, it is desirable to protect investments made by projects in 
recent years, the value of which led Russia to reach the top three largest recipients of FDI in the world.  
If the Crimean crisis continues, economic losses would be shared for all players involved.  
Therefore, according to the authors, in order to counter the risk of regional economic instability, it would be 
necessary a moderate and open approach of all parties by given the fact that a future economic cooperation between 
Ukraine, Russia and the EU is vital for achieving the most sustainable solution. 
Notes on the history of economic relations between Ukraine and the EU:  
1998 - Ukraine signed with the EU the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
2007 - 2011 - Ukraine starts the negotiations for the Association Agreement with emphasis on the creation of a 
Free Trade Area  
2012 – The EU Council from December adopted conclusions on partnership with Ukraine reaffirming the 
commitment to sign the Association Agreement  
2013 – The Adoption during the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council, held on 24 June, of the EU-Ukraine 
Association Agenda  
November 2013 - Suspension of preparations for signing the Association Agreement within the Eastern 
Partnership Summit in Vilnius 
March 21, 2014 - The signing by Ukraine of the preliminary provisions of the Association Agreement  
June 27, 2014 - The signing by Ukraine of the Association Agreement 
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